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Boone (2008a) proposes a new competition measure based on Relative Profit Differences 
(RPD) with superior theoretical properties. However, the empirical applicability and robust-
ness of the Boone-Indicator is still unknown. This paper aims to address that question. Using 
a rich, newly built, data set for German manufacturing enterprises, we test the empirical valid-
ity of the Boone-Indicator using cartel cases. Our analysis reveals that the traditional regres-
sion approach of the indicator fails to correctly indicate competition. A proposed augmented 
indicator based on RPDs performs better. The traditional Lerner-Index is still the only meas-
ure that correctly indicates the expected competitive changes. 
 
 
Keywords: Competition, Boone-Indicator, Cartels, Census Data  




Alexander Schiersch  Jens Schmidt-Ehmcke 
German Institute for Economic Research  German Institute for Economic Research 
Mohrenstraße 58  Mohrenstraße 58 
10117 Berlin  10117 Berlin 
e-mail: aschiersch@diw.de e-mail:  jschmidtehmcke@diw.de 
 
 
 1.  Introduction  
The study of competition is hampered by the scarcity of appropriate data and, in particular, by 
the lack of good indicators for the competitive environment that have wide coverage. Re-
searchers and policy-makers, for instance in antitrust authorities, usually rely on traditional 
measures like the price cost-margin (PCM) to assess the competition levels in industries. 
However, theoretical research raises doubts on the robustness of PCM. Amir (2003), Bulow 
and Klemperer (1999), Rosenthal (1980), and Stiglitz (1989) show that there are theoretically 
possible scenarios in which PCM increases with more intense competition. However, the 
practical importance of these counterexamples is still unknown. Despite these drawbacks, the 
PCM is still a popular measure in empirical research (see, for example, Pruteanu-Podpiera et 
al., 2007; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2006; Aghion et al., 2005; Nevo, 2001; 
Klette, 1999).  
Boone (2008a) extends the existing set of competition measures by suggesting an indi-
cator that relies on Relative Profit Differences (RPD). This approach is based on the notion 
that competition rewards efficiency. In industries with increasing competition inefficiently 
operating firms are punished more harshly than more efficient ones. Hereby, efficiency is de-
fined as the possibility to produce the same output with lower costs or, rather, lower marginal 
costs. Thus, comparing the relative profits between some arbitrarily efficient firm and a firm 
with greater efficiency contains information about the level of competition within that indus-
try. The more competitive the market is, the stronger is the proposed relationship between 
efficiency differences and performance differences. Two properties make the so called 
Boone-Indicator (BI) appealing: First, it has a robust theoretical foundation as a measure of 
competition, meaning that it depicts the level of competition correctly both when competition 
becomes more intense through more aggressive interaction between firms and when entry 
barriers are reduced. Second, it has the same data requirements as the PCM. 
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the empirical robustness of the Boone-Indicator 
using a newly constructed data set for German manufacturing enterprises. We proceed in 
three steps: First, we present the established parametric approach of estimating the BI. Second, 
we calculate the RPDs, as theoretically defined, using real world data and propose an aug-
mented indicator correcting for firm size. Finally we use cartel cases as natural experiments to 
evaluate the performance of the Boone-Indicator and compare it to the traditional PCM meas-
ure. The intuitive idea behind the cartel cases as a natural experiment is that we expect fiercer 
  2competition in the aftermath of its uncovering. This should be observed in our data and affect 
the competition measures.  
The empirical literature on the effects of efficiency on firm performance and the posi-
tive impact of competition on efficiency somewhat supports the assumed cohesion between 
efficiency, firm performance, and competition needed for the Boone-Indicator. One of the 
earliest studies examining the influence of competition on productivity is Nickell (1996). Us-
ing firm level data from EXSTAT, he finds evidence that higher competition leads to higher 
productivity. A number of papers try to identify the effect of competition on wage levels 
(Nickell, 1999) or innovative activity by firms (e.g., Porter, 1990; Geroski, 1995; Nickell, 
1996; Blundell et al., 1999). 
Despite theoretical robustness few studies apply the Boone-Indicator to real world data 
to date. The only paper published in a refereed journal, to our knowledge, is Bikker and Leu-
vensteijn (2008). Using data for the Dutch life insurance market, they calculate the Boone-
Indicator using three different approximations of the marginal costs: average variable costs, 
defined as management costs as a share of the total premium; marginal costs derived from a 
translog costs function; and scale adjusted marginal cost. Using a least-square dummy vari-
able approach, they regress these variables first one by one on logarithmized relative profits, 
then, in a second step, on the market share of insurance companies as an outcome variable. 
Their results point to a weak competition in the Dutch life insurance industry when compared 
to other industries. However, the robustness of their results is unclear.  
Additionally, the Boone-Indicator is used in a number of reports and discussion papers. 
Griffith et al. (2005) investigate the empirical usefulness of a slightly modified BI based on 
relative profits. Using data from the annual report and accounts filed by firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange over the period 1986-1999, they compare the relative profit measure 
with the PCM and the Herfindahl index. Their main results show a positive correlation be-
tween the new measure and PCM but no correlation with Herfindahl, which raises questions 
about the usefulness of the Herfindahl index as a measure of competition. Furthermore, they 
provide evidence that the relative profit measure is less affected by cyclical changes than the 
PCM. However, they can not derive recommendations on which might be the “correct” meas-
ure of competition because “without a prior information about the ‘true’ degree of competi-
tion … it is difficult to say whether the relative profit measure is empirically better than the 
price-cost-margin” (Griffith et al. 2005: 14). Creusen et al. (2006) use a similar method to 
examine the competition in Dutch market sectors during the years 1993-2001 based on firm 
level data finding a slight decline in the intensity of competition during that time. More re-
  3cently, the Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry studied trend changes in the intensity of 
competition across Finnish business sectors (Malirante et al. 2007). The report focuses on the 
service sector and reports the results of nine different measures of competition including tradi-
tional measures like Herfindahl, PCM and the four-firm concentration index as well as six 
different parameterizations of the Boone-Indicator. Their results suggest an increase in com-
petitive pressure in Finland in the analyzed time interval. However, the outcomes vary a lot 
with respect to the different parameterizations of the BI and they state that “…the optimal 
specification and estimation of the Boone indicator remains an open question and should thus 
be debated.” (Malirante et al. 2007: 23) 
We organize this paper as follows: In Section 2 we present the Boone-Indicator and 
compare its theoretical robustness to the traditional PCM measure. In Section 3 we list the 
relevant cartel cases in the power cable sector, the cement sector, and the ready mix concrete 
sector. In Section 4 we give a detailed description of the dataset and present first descriptive 
statistics. In Section 5 we discuss the Boone-Indicator and propose a modification to control 
for firm size and present the main results of our analysis. Finally, in the last section we collect 
the main findings and conclude the paper. 
2.  Measuring Competition  
A common competition measure is the Lerner-Index or Price Cost Margin (PCM). It is based 
in neoclassic theory where under perfect competition prices   p   equal marginal costs   c . 
Hence, the PCM, calculated as   ii pcp  i , takes values greater than zero if competition is not 
perfect and firms are able to enforce prices above marginal costs. As competition becomes 
fiercer PCM approaches zero. To evaluate competition on markets or in industries, the indus-
try PCM is calculated as a simple or weighted mean of individual PCMs. The latter is usually 
derived by calculating it with firm market shares. This ensures that the market power of big 
firms is adequately captured. The common interpretation is as with firm individual PCM. It 
decreases with fiercer competition and increases with weaker competition.  
However, it is not a robust competition measure. Amir (2003) shows that, under cer-
tain conditions, an increase in competition through an increase in the number of firms in a 
market can result in an increasing average PCM. Given certain circumstances Stiglitz (1989) 
shows that profits per unit sales can rise in a recession. Thus, even though competition among 
firms increases during recessions, industry PCM also increases. Another potential source of 
error can be the reallocation effect. As a result of fiercer competition, the market share of the 
more efficient firms increases while that for less efficient firms decrease. Thus, the weighted 
  4average PCM can increase if the increase in the market share of the more efficient firms over-
compensates the decrease of the respective individual PCMs. Therefore, the Lerner-Index is, 
at least theoretically, potentially misleading.  
Against this background and the fact that the interpretation of popular concentration 
indices like Herfindahl is also not straightforward in terms of competition, Boone (2008a) 
proposes a new competition measure. Termed Relative Profit Differences (RPD), its main 
idea is that competition rewards efficiency. To get the measure working, Boone postulates 
some assumptions of which the most important ones are outlined here. First, firms under con-
sideration act in a market with relatively homogeneous goods. Secondly, we assume symme-
try. Hence, firms act on a level playing field that ensures that changes in competition affect 
firms directly and not indirectly through changes in that playing field. It also implies that 
“…firm i’s profits are the same as firm j’s profits would be if firm j was in firm i’s situation.” 
(Athey/Schmutzler 2001: 5). Thus, within the theoretical framework of the indicator, this im-
plies equal profit level for two equally efficient companies. Thirdly, we are able to rank firms 
with respect to their efficiency   i n . Thereby the efficiency index   N  needs to be one dimen-
sional to ensure transitivity. Given that the production costs are captured by    , Cqn with   as 
























The proposition of the first two quotients on the left-hand side is clear-cut. The first 
states that firms have positive marginal costs. The second quotients defines that costs are 
lower the more efficient firms are. Finally, the quotient at the right-hand side states that mar-
ginal costs are lower for more efficient firms. Given these assumptions, firms play a two stage 
game. In the first stage, they decide whether or not to enter. This is determined by the entry 
costs and the expected profit. Only firms enter that are able to recoup entry costs. In the sec-
ond stage, the remaining firms simultaneously choose their actions to maximize profits. This 
gives a subgame equilibrium for each competitive state.  
                                                 
1   Boone (2008a) 
  5Boone uses two parameters to model changes in competition. One is the conduct pa-
rameter  , which mirrors the aggressiveness of firms. The second is the change in entry costs 
 .
2 Then, the output reallocation effect works in the following way:
3 
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Given these conditions, while an increase in competition can decrease the output of 
firms, this decrease will be smaller for more efficient firms. As a result the market share for 
the more efficient firms increases while that for the less efficient firms shrinks. Hence, com-
petition rewards efficient firms. Given these setting, the RPD is calculated as a quotient of 
profit level differences:
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Increasing competition raises this measure for any three firms with nn . As 
Boone (2008a) proves, his measure of competition is robust to distortions out of the realloca-
tion effect. The following example will illustrate how the reallocation effect works and how it 
affects both RPD and PCM. We have a simple linear demand function, three firms with con-
stant marginal costs and no entry costs.
n   
5 As shown in Table 1 fiercer competition, simulated 
by an increase in substitutability of products, results in a rise of the weighted average PCM 
while the respective RPD is decreasing. Hence, PCM signals a fall of competition while RPD 
correctly signals fiercer competition.  
< insert Table 1 about here > 
However, if there are more than three firms, comparing RPDs over time for each com-
pany is impractical. One convenient way, proposed by Boone (2008a), is to plot the RPDs. 
Using a firm’s normalized efficiency for the x-coordinates gives a function that is always 
bounded at one on both axes. Figure 1 presents an example. As in the previous example, we 
model changes in competition via substitutability of products. The increase in competition 
leads to lower firm specific RPDs. To measure the change in competition one now calculates 
                                                 
2   For a detailed discussion see Boone (2004). 
3   Boone (2004) 
4   Boone (2008a). Hereby N is the efficiency index of ni and I is the set of firms in the market. 
5   This is a modified example from Boone (2008b). 
  6and compares the area under both curves. Since we have normalized values the area is 
bounded between zero and one, with zero implying perfect competition and one the complete 
absence of competition. The area in our example shrinks and thus correctly indicates fiercer 
competition.  
< insert Figure 1 about here > 
3.  Cartel Cases 
In order to evaluate the robustness of the Boone-Indicator we use a natural experiment of 
three major cartel cases in different sectors. A cartel is defined as an explicit contractual 
agreement between legally independent companies in order to restrict competition and in-
crease profits. Such contracts define the prices, quantities, markets, etc., for each participating 
firm. Further the contracts also implement a system of sanctions to ensure that deviant behav-
ior by cartel members is properly punished. Sometimes establishing a cartel includes the for-
mation of an organization that coordinates and monitors participating firms.  
In addition to explicit cartels, there is also collusive behavior. This is characterized by 
the absence of contractual agreements or any form of record. Instead it often relies on infor-
mal and mostly oral agreements. Although it has the same objective as a cartel, it usually can-
not restrict competition as effectively since firms have incentives to deviate from the collusion 
strategy and the sanction mechanism is missing.
6 However, since this way of restraining com-
petition is hard to detect we only focus on cartels.  
For the purpose of our analysis cartels have to meet three criteria. Firstly, the cartel 
must be nationwide. This ensures that it was able to restrict competition all over Germany. 
Second, it must have been a cartel case of significant size. Hence, the cartel actually must 
have gained a significant control over the national market. Both criteria ensure that the effect 
can be found in the data. We take the size of the cartel fine as a proxy for the level of the dis-
tortion of competition. Finally, the product of a cartel should be as homogenous as possible, 
leaving as little room for product diversification and, thusly, price discrimination.  
When such cartels are uncovered and terminated, we expect fiercer competition in 
subsequent periods. This assumption does not imply that competition changes to perfect com-
petition, nor does it neglect the possibility of future informal oral agreements by the involved 
companies. However, as previously noted, collusive behavior is less effective than explicit 
cartels. Moreover, it would not be rational to take the risk of an explicit cartel in the first place 
                                                 
6   However, there are of course gaming strategies which lead to similar results, given certain well specified condition. See 
for instance Bester (2004).  
  7if collusion could restrict competition at the same extent from the very beginning. Therefore 
we impose the weak assumption that competition is significantly higher in the aftermath of a 
legal cartel case compared to the cartel period.  
Power cable cartel 
The first cartel that appears to be suitable for our analysis is the cartel of German power cable 
producers. It was constructed as a price- and quota-cartel, where producers agreed not only on 
global market shares but also on shares for every big customer within a precisely defined pe-
riod and on the respective price range. In order to govern the cartel the “Elektro-Treuhand 
GmbH” (ETG) was founded as a joint venture of all involved producers. The mechanism 
worked in the following way: Every customer query was reported to the ETG. Since ETG also 
did the cartel accounting, it knew which firms already were at quota during any given time 
period, and which were not. They passed price- and discount-information to the companies 
involved to ensure that in the following negotiations those companies scheduled to get the job 
succeeded at the defined price. The cartel controlled the entire power cable market for several 
decades. (Fleischhauer, 1997; Drucksache 14/1139). 
The cartel ended in September 1996 in a nationwide search and seizure by the Federal 
Cartel Office. By the end of 1997 the cartel office had charged 16 companies, two cable in-
dustry organizations and 28 individuals with a fine of 280 million Deutsch Mark (143 million 
Euros) in total, the largest fine in German history at that time. All companies, except one, 
accepted the fine and thus acknowledged having participated in an illegal cartel in order to 
avoid competition. The organizational structure of the cartel was terminated, including the 
closure of the ETG and the two cable industry organizations (Drucksache 14/1139). 
Cement cartel  
The second cartel in our analysis is the German cement cartel. It was created in the aftermath 
of the German unification in the early 1990s as a price-, quota- and regional cartel covering 
the entire German market for cement including importation (Pressemitteilung 19/09). All ma-
jor players and also medium sized producers took part in the cartel. Due to the physical prop-
erties of cement, which leads to excessively high transport costs over 300 kilometers, the 
market for cement is regional. However, all players agreed on a nationwide organization of 
regional cartels with explicit organizations for each regional market. The German market was 
divided into an east, west, north and south submarkets. At this level the organizational struc-
ture varied. However, in each submarket contractual agreements were made (VI-2a Kart 2 - 
6/08 OWi). The nationwide monitoring was done by the umbrella association of the German 
cement producers (“Bundesverband der Deutschen Zementindustrie e.V.”). In the event that 
  8cement was delivered outside a firm’s home market, compensatory payments were arranged 
during ad hoc meetings held in Munich, the so-called “Money-Karussell” (money-carousel). 
The cartel ended in July 2002 in a nationwide search and seizure of 30 companies. By 
the end of 2003 the Federal Cartel Offices levied twelve companies and several persons with a 
cartel fine of 702 million Euros in total (Drucksache 15/5790). However the companies under 
suspicion, save for the company acting as principal witness, protested the amount of the fine. 
The legal disputes lasted until June 2009 when the court finally confirmed all allegations but 
reduced the fine to 330 million Euros. However, with respect to market effects we can state 
two things. First, as stated by the court, witnesses, and various experts in the legal case, the 
consequence of the uncovering of the cartel was a price war that lasted at least until 2005. 
Second, to gain more information for the court, a second national seizure was carried out in 
2004. There was no evidence whatsoever that the cartel still operated. Hence, the market con-
dition changed toward more competition. Blanckenburg and Geist (2009), confirm this, find-
ing fiercer competition after 2002.  
Ready-mix concrete cartel 
The last cartel case used in this study is that of the ready-mixed concrete industry. This was 
actually not one cartel but many regional cartels. This is because the physical properties of 
ready-mixed concrete limits transport time to roughly 60 minutes after a truck is filled.
7 How-
ever, the entire German market was governed by regional cartels. The cartels were organized 
as quota-cartels that specified the share for each participating firms within the regional market. 
As typical for illegal cartels, regular meetings were established in order to monitor and govern 
the activities of all involved parties, as for instance proved in the case of the Berlin ready-
mixed concrete cartel (KRB 2/05). As established by the courts, most cartels in the West were 
formed around 1990, the ones in East Germany around 1995 (Drucksache 14/6300; Drucksa-
che 15/1226).  
The first cartel was uncovered in May 1999 in Greater Berlin. Additional cartel in-
quests were opened against companies in the federal states of Sachsen-Anhalt and Nieder-
sachsen. Consequently the Federal Cartel Office initially charged 69 companies in 29 consor-
tiums with a cartel fine of 370 million Deutsch Mark (189 million Euros). With evidence 
found in these cases and additional information, the cartel office carried out a nationwide 
search and seizure of 48 companies in March 2000. Moreover, as a result of the cartel inquiry 
on the cement market, some of the cement companies cooperated with cartel offices and 
                                                 
7   This information comes from the umbrella association of German ready-mix concrete industry. For further information 
on the specifics of ready-mixed concrete market see also Syverson (2008) 
  9passed further information about the ready-mixed concrete regional cartels to the authorities. 
This allowed the authorities to open new cases against 70 ready-mixed concrete companies all 
over Germany. The legal dispute lasted until 2005 when the Federal Supreme Court followed 
the Federal Cartel Office in all main cases and stated that the participating companies had 
established and operated illegal cartels, with the last cartel uncovered in 2001. (Drucksache 
16/5710; KRB 2/05). Thus, roughly 140 companies were convicted with a fine of approxi-
mately 167 million Euros.  
In the meantime the sector saw major changes. On the one hand, due to high overca-
pacity many companies closed (Drucksache 16/5710). Two major players, Larfarge and Han-
son, completely stopped its market engagement. Moreover, the Cartel Office approved 136 
mergers between 2002 and 2006, which were seen as a result of a fierce competition while the 
market struggled with overcapacities and declining sales. Moreover, State and Federal Cartel 
Offices approved structural-crisis-cartels or cartels of small and medium-sized enterprises 
under supervision of the cartel authorities (“Mittelstandskartell”) in some regional market in 
order to support the regular capacity reduction and the process of adjusting to the new market 
conditions (Drucksache 15/1226; Drucksache 15/5790; Drucksache 16/5710). 
These three cartels meet our defined analysis needs. Each was large enough to influ-
ence competition at the national level and included all major suppliers and producers while 
producing homogenous goods. All three cartels had illegal organizational structures and for-
mal cartel agreements needed to coordinate participating firms. Hence, it is expected that col-
lusion without such a structure is not as effective. Therefore, we expect fiercer competition 
without such an organizational structure. Finally, all were heavily fined due to the extent of 
the distorted competition. 
4.  Data 
The data is taken from the German Cost Structure Census (Kostenstrukturerhebung) and the 
German Production Census (Produktionserhebung). Each dataset was gathered and complied 
by the German Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) over the period 1995-2006. Plant 
level data is merged to firm level data using a common identifier.
 The strength of the dataset 
is its sample coverage and reliability of information. It covers almost all large German manu-
facturing firms with 500 or more employees over the entire time span. Firms with fewer than 
500 employees are included as a random subsample that is designed to be representative for 
  10the small firm segment as a whole in every industry.
8 Only firms with 20 or more employees 
are covered.
9  
The Cost Structure Census contains information on several input categories, namely 
payroll, employer contributions to the social security system, fringe benefits, expenditures for 
material inputs, self-provided equipment, goods for resale, energy costs, external wage-work, 
external maintenance and repair, tax depreciation of fixed assets, subsidies, rents and leases, 
insurance costs, sales tax, other taxes and public fees, interest on external capital as well as 
“other” costs such as license fees, bank charges and postage, or expenses.
10 Finally, the Ger-
man Production Census gives detailed information about the number of products produced, 
approximated by the nine-digit product classification system (Güterverzeichnis für Produk-
tionsstatistiken) of the Federal Statistical Office. This variable gives us as an important ele-
ment to identify the relevant sectors. 
All previously mentioned studies followed Boone (2008a) and analyzed the competi-
tion based on three digit sector classification. With our rich dataset we are able to focus on a 
four digit sector and goods classifications, defining the respective markets even more detailed 
than any previous analysis. As discussed above, these are the power cable sector (WZ 3130), 
the cement sector (WZ 2651) and the ready-mix concrete sector (WZ 2663). Each of these 
sectors is characterized by a relatively homogeneous good. In order to guarantee relatively 
comparable companies, we only look at companies which have at least 75 percent of their 
overall turnover in one of these sectors. All other companies are dropped.  
The sample contains a number of observations with extreme values that proved to im-
pact the calculation of the PCM and the estimation of the Boone-Indicator. Therefore, we ex-
clude observations from the analysis for which the cost for a certain input category in relation 
to gross value added fall in the upper or lower one percentile of the sample per year.  
According to Boone, we calculate profit by subtracting variable costs from revenue. 
Hereby, we define revenue as revenue out of self produced goods. Hence, it does not include 
revenues out of other activities like renting or trading operations. The variable costs contain 
‘consumption of raw materials’, ‘energy’, ‘gross wages’, ‘legal and additional social insur-
ance contributions’, ‘costs for contract workers’ and ‘costs of repairs’. Following Boone 
(2008a) we calculate two different measures for efficiency, i) average variable costs, which 
we define as total variable costs per sales and ii) labor productivity, defined as gross value 
                                                 
8   Samples are drawn in 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2003. 
9   In some particular industries, even firms with less than 20 employees are included as a random draw. 
10   For more information about the Cost Structure Census surveys in Germany, we refer the reader to Fritsch et al. (2004). 
  11added per employee. Additionally we also use sales per employee as a third measure for effi-
ciency. Descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 3.  
5.  Empirical Investigation 
We present our analysis in three steps. First, we present the parametric approach to apply 
Boone’s idea and discuss its main drawbacks. In a second step we apply the Boone-Indicator 
as theoretically defined on real data. We discuss its drawbacks and propose an augmented 
indicator correcting for firm size. Finally, we use the above described cartel cases as natural 
experiments to test for the empirical applicability of the Boone-Indicators and compare its 
performance with that of the traditional PCM.  
5.1. Discussion and Modification of the Boone-Indicator  
Before the indicators are tested using the cartel cases, we briefly discuss the applicability of 
the indicator on real word data. Griffith et al. (2005) was the first to propose a regression of 
average variable costs on logarithmized profits. This is based on the idea behind the Boone-
Indicator that the more efficient a company becomes the greater the profit should be, ceterus 
paribus. Since marginal costs are unobservable, average variable costs (AVC), defined as 
total variable costs divided by sales, are taken as a crude proxy for marginal costs. They are 
also used to assess firm efficiency. The estimated beta-coefficient measures the profit elastic-
ity of the respective firms. More precisely, “…it measures the percentage decrease (increase) 
in firm i’s profit if its variable costs (i.e. marginal costs relative to price) increase (decrease) 
by one percentage point.” (Griffith et al. 2005: 6). Since the relationship between profits and 
average variable costs must be negative, the estimated coefficient needs to be negative. As 
competition intensifies, the slope of the regression should become even more steeply negative, 
following the idea that inefficient firms are punished more harshly by fiercer competition. 
Although we will calculate RPDs, we also adopt this approach for comparative pur-
pose. However, we follow Creusen et al. (2006) and estimated the elasticity by means of 
yearly log-log regressions:      ln ln ijt jt ijt ijt AVC       with  year,   firm ti    and  . Then 
the coefficient plainly gives the percentage change in profits due to a one percent change in 
average variable costs. As shown by Boone et al. (2007) with simulations within his theoreti-
cal framework, changes in competition are correctly identified by this model.  
=market j
However, measuring competition this way can cause the usual problems for regression 
analysis. The problems are well known and therefore we just want to mention one problem 
directly related to the desired analysis. One task in that analysis is the definition of markets. 
  12The more precisely we can capture a market, the less other factors or markets influence the 
outcome and the better the subsequent competition estimates should be. On the other hand, 
the more precisely we size a market, the fewer observations we will have. Moreover, markets 
with few players are of special interest for competition analysis, but fewer observations de-
crease stability of regressions. An outlier can have a significant impact on the slope and the 
significance of the coefficient (Urban and Myerl 2008).  
A second problem is related to firm size. As long as we operate under the model’s as-
sumptions, the most efficient firm must become the biggest firm in terms of market share and 
consequently, due to its efficiency level, it also must make the greatest profit.  With respect to 
linear regression analysis we must consider that in reality big firms are not necessarily the 
most efficient ones and thus, it is possible to find a nonnegative beta-coefficient.
11  
In addition to the regression analysis that is usually used to apply the Boone idea on 
real data, this paper tries to estimate the RPDs. Initially we assess the efficiency of firms in a 
one-dimensional and transitive way. Following Boone (2008a) we use the average variable 
costs, defined as total variable costs per sales   TVC sales  and labour productivity, defined as 
gross value added per employee   VA employee  as efficiency index N. We add sales per em-
ployee   sales employee  as a third measure. Than the RPDs are calculated for each market (j) and 
each firm (i) in every year (t) as: 
    
 










   
  
  , 
where profits are defined as sales minus total variable costs   ijt ijt ijt ST V C   . The RPD 
can only take values between zero and one, with one for the most efficient and zero the least 
efficient firm. The efficiency of the firms is normalized via     nn n n     .  
As the example in Figure 2 reveals, which depicts the RPDs for the cable industry (4 
digit classification) in 2006, plainly applying this model on real world data is not sufficient.
12 
The RPDs are located between roughly 30 and -1, while we should see a scatter plot within 
the boundaries of zero and one. We do have the most efficient firm located at the coordinate 
(1,1) as it should be. However that firm has a profit below many of its competitors and it fol-
lows  . Thus, the RPD can take values above one for less effi-        ijt ijt ijt ijt nn n n        
                                                 
11   That both, size and few observations can have an impact is not just a theoretical problem as the results of Griffith et al. 
(2005) show.  
12   In this example the efficiency is defined by average variable costs. However, we can show further examples with labour 
productivity.  
  13cient firms. At the same time we have a least efficient firm, which has a profit above that of 
other firms, resulting in negative numerators for these observations.  
< insert Figure 2 about here > 
This happens due to firm size. Obviously in the real world there are firms that are 
really efficient, no matter of how efficiency is captured, but they can be small, at least at cer-
tain point in time. On the other hand, large companies may not be as efficient, but because of 
the larger size, the firms make larger profits. To overcome this problem the RPD must be cal-
culated taking firm size into account. This can be done by means of number of employees or 
sales. However, applying workforce to normalize profits does not give a good fit. We still 
have RPDs significantly below zero and above one (Table 2), regardless of the efficiency in-
dex used. This might be caused by a weakness of the data set. It lacks information about the 
number of temporary workers and for how long they stayed in the company, but we know 
through a costs category that some firms used temporary workers. This biases the profits for 
the respective firms as well as the efficiency if labour productivity and sales per employee is 
applied. Therefore we do not use workforce in the calculation of the efficiency or to normal-
ize profits. Instead, in the subsequent analysis profits will by normalized by sales, which is 
turnover out of the core business without trading or other activities. Thus, the RPD is calcu-
lated as:  

   
 
ijt ijt ijt ijt
ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt
n sales n sales
RPD n







For the efficiency index we apply the average variable costs. In order to estimate the 
area under each curve we use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). It is a nonparametric 
method that envelops the scatter plot at its outer boundary. We abstain from presenting the 
method here and refer the interested reader to Canter et al. (2007) for a concise introduction 
and to Simar and Wilson (2005) for a detailed discussion. Given the estimated curve we are 
able to derive the corresponding area by integration.  
5.2. Results 
Given the above defined RPD we proceed with testing the validity of the Boone-Indicator 
using the cartel cases. For this end we estimate the PCM of each firm as proposed by Boone 
(2008a), and aggregate them into yearly industry PCMs using market share as the weight. The 
market share is derived as the share of the firm sales on industry sales in a year. Further, we 
  14estimate the BI as beta coefficients of the above outlined regression approach (afterwards also 
called parametric indicator). Finally, we calculate the modified RPDs and the respective areas 
as discussed above (also called nonparametric indicator). The change in competition is meas-
ured by subtracting the respective indicator in the base period from itself in the reference pe-
riod. Regardless of the indicator under consideration, a positive result shows an increase in 
competition between the periods. A negative result on the other hand indicates decreasing 
competitive pressure over time.  
We used Welch’s t-test for evaluating the significance of changes in PCM since it ac-
counts for unequal variances in two samples. The same test is applied when comparing the 
beta coefficients. However, the test can only be applied if both of the beta coefficients are 
significant on there own. Otherwise, we depict just the difference labelling it as not significant. 
Since the level of competition by means of RPDs is measured as area, tests based on means 
and variances can not be applied. Therefore, the significance of differences between the areas 
is calculated applying the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the underlying RPDs. 
Given the estimates and tests, we can use the cartel events to derive the validity of the 
indicators. As discussed in section 3 we expect fiercer competition in the aftermath of the 
uncovering of a cartel. Hence, we look at the estimated changes in competition after such an 
event compared to periods before the event. When possible, we look at the three years after 
and the three years before the cartel case. The year of the event is not taken into consideration, 
because the effect on the competition level in that year is not straightforward since we only 
have annual data. The relevant biannual differences are presented in Table 4 to Table 6. 
The first cartel we take a look at is the cable cartel. The cartel was uncovered in 1996. 
Due to time limitations in our dataset we can only compare the changes in competition be-
tween 1995 and 1997 to 1999. Looking at the Lerner Index (Table 6), in all of the respective 
biannual comparisons we see positive differences where two out of three of these differences 
are significant. Thus, the PCMs indicate the expected increase in competition. The nonpara-
metric measure (Table 5) also indicates fiercer competition in the years 1997 to 1999 com-
pared to 1995, although just one of the differences is significant. The differences in elasticities 
(Table 4) on the other hand are positive and negative, thus signalling decrease and increase in 
competition after the cartel was terminated. However, the betas are not significantly different. 
This is caused by the fact that the beta coefficient in 1995 is not significant at a 10 percent 
level. Even if we ignore this fact and test for significant differences in betas, we find all chan-
ges to be significant, not only the positive difference. Thus with respect to the aim of this pa-
per we must state that PCM and the nonparametric indicator behaved as expected, indicating 
  15fiercer competition in the aftermath of the termination of a cartel. In contrast, the parametric 
indicator did not behave as expected. 
Looking at the cement cartel, we find similar results as for the cable cartel. As dis-
cussed above, the cartel was uncovered in 2002, thus, we evaluate the changes in competition 
of the period 1999 to 2001 against 2005 to 2006.
13 Again, the weighted PCMs signal fiercer 
competition after the event, where all results are significant. Yet, it is now the parametric in-
dicator signaling fiercer competition without exception and with all changes significant. To a 
certain degree the area changes also indicate fiercer competition. Unfortunately none of the 
changes are significant. Thus, although we only find positive values indicating fiercer compe-
tition, with the absence of significance we must record that the nonparametric indicator shows 
no change in competition after the cement cartel was terminated. 
Finally we look at the ready-mixed concrete cartels, where the first one was uncovered 
in 1999 while the last one stopped its activity in 2001 as discussed before. We therefore de-
fine the period 1996 to 1998 as base period and 2002 to 2004 as reference period. As pre-
sented in Table 6, the PCMs differences again show the expected sign and are all significant. 
The parametric indicator on the other hand is pointing to the opposite direction. All differ-
ences are negative and at least two are significant. If we overlook the insignificants of the 
2003 and 2004 betas and test for differences, six out of nine negative differences would be 
significant. The parametric indicator actually suggests weaker competition in the aftermath of 
the termination of the ready-mixed concrete cartels. The nonparametric indicator is not per-
forming better. Although seven out of nine biannual comparisons are positive, pointing to-
ward fiercer competition, two are negative and no change is found to be significant.  
< insert Figure 3 about here > 
Figure 3 summarizes the main findings, depicting the direction of changes in competi-
tion with and without taking the significance of the changes into account. Here it is especially 
interesting that the parametric Boone measure points just once in the expected direction, re-
gardless of significance. The nonparametric indicator, on the other hand, fails just once if we 
ignore significance. Indeed, if we look closely at that unexpected outcome we find seven bi-
annual differences out of nine signalling fiercer competition, thus pointing into the expected 
direction.  
 
                                                 
13   There are to few observations in 2003 and 2004 after running the outlier detection, so that we could not use this years due 
to the data protection rules of the FDZ.  
  166.  Conclusion 
Using a rich newly built data set for German manufacturing enterprises, we test the empirical 
validity of the Boone-Indicator. This is a new competition measure that, from its theoretical 
properties, proved to be more robust than the Lerner-Index (also called PCM). The proof of its 
empirical practicability and robustness is missing, however. This paper aims to shed light on 
that question. To this end we use large cartel cases as events to compare the indicated compe-
tition levels before and after a cartel was uncovered and stopped operating. Since all of the 
chosen cartels significantly restricted market competition, we expected fiercer competition in 
the aftermath of the debunking of a cartel.  
In the actual analysis we compare the performance of three competition measures. The 
first is the Lerner-Index as a classical measure of competition. The second is the Boone-
Indicator calculated as beta coefficient of a log-log regression, as proposed by Boone et al. 
(2007) and various other authors. Finally the Boone-Indicator derived by means of Relative 
Profit Differences (RPD) is calculated using real data for the first time.  
Our analysis reveals that the latter cannot be applied to real data as theoretically de-
fined. This is because the relationship between the efficiency of a firm and its profit level is 
not as designed in Boone’s theoretical framework, where the most efficient company is al-
ways, by design, the biggest firm in terms of market share. Our results suggest that this rela-
tionship does not hold in reality. Therefore we propose a way to account for firm size in the 
calculation of RPDs.  
With respect to the performance of the indicator in the face of uncovered cartels we 
note that the Lerner-Index performed as expected. In every case it indicated fiercer competi-
tion in the aftermath of a cartel case with almost all biannual comparison to be significant. 
Hence, although not theoretically robust, in this analysis it proved its empirical usefulness. 
This we cannot state for the two Boone-Indicators, in particular the regression approach. Re-
gardless of whether or not we account for the significance of changes and betas, the indicator 
just once indicates fiercer competition. This supports our doubts regarding this approach. The 
Boone-Indicator based on RPDs also does not perform as well as the Lerner-Index. This is 
mainly because the changes are often not significant. Leaving significance aside, the Boone-
Indicator by means of RPD and taking firm size into account perform almost as well as PCM.  
Based on our findings we conclude that the Boone-Indicator, although theoretically 
superior, is, at least at this stage, not an empirically robust indicator. The Lerner-Index on the 
other hand indicates changes in competition as expected. However, the results of the RPD 
  17based Boone-Indicator are promising. Future research should focus on alternative methods to 
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Figure 2: RPDs for cable industry in 2006
15 


































                                                 
14   We apply the same demand function as in the example of table 1. We have 20 firms in the beginning with constant mar-
ginal costs of  10 i ci  . There are no entry costs,  20, 2 ab    and d increases from 0.1 to 2. The solid line captures the 
RPDs in situation one, hence with low intense competition due to a d of 0.1, while the dotted line is with  . To over-
come the problem that appears if the least efficient firm is assessed, which means dividing by zero, we calculate inverse 
RPDs, hence: 
2 d 
            ,, ,, n nn n             . The normalized efficiency is calculated as:   nn n n       
    with  nn n   
15   The efficiency was measured by average variable costs.  
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Figure 3: change in competition after the termination of the cartels
16 
 Event  PCM  Boon-Indicator PCM  Boon-Indicator 
Industry (4-digit 
classification) 
   log.   
regression
RPD   log.   
regression 
RPD 
power cable (3130)  1996  ↑
*  →
*  ↑
*  ↑  →  ↑ 
cement (2651)  2002  ↑
*  ↑
*  →











                                                 
16   * marks the direction changes in competition that take significance into account. 
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Table 1: The reallocation effect and how it affects PCM and RPD
17 




d=0.1  0.950 0.587 0.465 0.680 0.262 




Table 2: Mean absolute deviation of RPDs form the boundaries of One and Zero for different 
efficiency measures and normalized profits
18 
  labor productivity  sales per employee  total average variable cost 
sectors  2651 2663 3130  2651 2663 3130  2651  2663 3130 
years  profit normalized by number of employees 
1995 0.15  0.144***  0.122*  0.372**  0.068***  0.128*  -  0.293***  0.03 
1996  0.081 0.002 0.27  0.129 0.002 0.27  -  0.031 0.006 
1997  0.389 0.027 0.139***  0.389 0.027 0.139***  -  0.226***  0.063 
1998  0.041  0.39*** 0.348*** 0.041  0.39*** 0.348***  0.124  0.045** 0.509*** 
1999 0.411  0.014** 0.258  0.411  0.014**  0.258  -  0.026***  0.881*** 
2000  0.531  0.062** 0.154*** 0.531  0.062** 0.154***  0.062  0.082  1.88*** 
2001 0.158  0.02  0.316***  0.158  0.02  0.316*** 0.126**  0.199**  1.214*** 
2002 0.236  0.085** -  0.236  0.085**  -  -  0.04  0.088*** 
2003   -  0.008**    0.02  0.008**    0.052  0.233* 
2004   0.062** 0.084**    0.062**  0.088    0.53**  0.11** 
2005  0.094 0.067**  0.065* 0.094 0.067**  0.075*  0.163  0.351**  0.071*** 
2006  0.554*  0.03 0.011 0.554*  0.03 0.011  2.225*  0.326*  0.353*** 
              
years  profit normalized by sales 
1995  4.326*** 1.8***  0.517***  4.326*** 5.191*** 0.783***  -  -  - 
1996 0.45**  0.477***  1.018***  0.45**  0.477***  1.018*** -  -  - 
1997 0.169  0.303***  0.27***  0.169  0.303***  0.27***  -  -  - 
1998  0.222*** 0.064*** 0.605**  0.222*** 0.064*** 0.605**  -  -  - 
1999  0.903**  0.541*** 13.839*** 0.903**  0.375*** 13.839***  -  -  - 
2000 7.21*** 24.66***  0.544***  0.052  24.66***  0.544*** -  -  - 
2001  1.176*** 0.321*** 5.213***  1.176*** 0.321*** 5.213***  -  -  - 
2002  0.787** 6.764***  0.759*** 0.787** 6.764***  0.759***  -  -  - 
2003   0.541***  32.276***    0.61***  32.276***    -  - 
2004   2.585***  0.292***    2.585***  1.615***   -  - 
2005 2.035  0.862***  6.725***  2.035  0.862***  8.964*** -  -  - 
2006  0.661 0.211 0.488***  0.661 0.308 0.488***  -  -  - 




                                                 
j
17   The demand function is   1 , ii
ji
pxx a b x d x 

   and is taken from Boone (2008b). We apply a=20, b=2 and 
marginal costs are c1=0.5, c2=5 and c3=7. The substitutability is captured by d, where the quotient  1 db   for perfect 
substitutes. 
  We do not report the RPD for the most and the least efficient firm since they have to be one and zero at both times by 
definition.  
18   The table shows the absolute mean deviation of observed RPDs. The t-test was applied to test the significance of the 
deviation. 
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   labor productivity  sales per employee  average variable cost  profit per employee  profit  profit per sales 
  years  N mean stdev N mean stdev N mean stdev N mean stdev N mean stdev N mean stdev 
1995 12 275941.51 129813.93 12 250929.88 135268.84 12 0.649 0.098 10 83120.21 28026.36 10 24654701.55 17453737.68 10 0.357 0.072 
1996 14 265036.62 127948.35 14 249585.34 130711.21 14 0.629 0.105 12 88773.66 32464.45 12 22778734.13 15832666.98 12 0.377 0.076 
1997 12 276189.53 145353.94 12 261612.75 150995.23 12 0.687 0.137 10 74634.88 39439.96 10 16802487.80 16717070.01 10 0.307 0.123 
1998 15 278276.44 156382.50 15 270103.39 156462.29 15 0.698 0.168 13 76120.76 46540.80 13 14735482.19 15604300.49 13 0.303 0.155 
1999 11 274748.10 134320.53 11 270853.22 131465.84 11 0.642 0.117 9 88671.80 41351.98 9 14200256.44 5614375.85 9 0.354 0.088 
2000 10 288927.17 146704.66 10 282349.24 148575.94 10 0.636 0.128 8 88255.96 32752.75 8 13883868.00 6443732.38 8 0.365 0.102 
2001 11 270489.54 119815.39 11 263364.86 119862.98 11 0.621 0.087 9 90750.26 36495.89 9 14446138.39 5230236.09 9 0.373 0.046 
2002 10 245045.22 121731.84 10 236704.63 114060.71 10 0.697 0.143 8 67226.60 32639.25 8 11084038.59 5612858.25 8 0.295 0.118 
2003 5 300541.35 149883.91 5 296174.19 140902.28 5 0.806 0.127 3 - - 3 - - 3 -  - 
2004 6 309138.85 164345.12 6 302090.05 155287.22 6 0.750 0.109 4 - - 4 - - 4 -  - 















2006 9 324927.22 146052.86 9 316989.06 140402.72 9 0.789 0.092 7 65738.91 26572.20 7 6262759.34 4123335.23 7 0.212  0.063 
1995 54 251117.62 129036.76 54 233626.90 101980.56 54 0.747 0.109 52 60371.38 38170.91 52 2616140.67 1988239.08 52 0.251 0.100 
1996 53 254805.13 113837.36 53 244309.09 111584.94 53 0.753 0.093 51 61082.96 39192.39 51 2814139.71 2323074.70 51 0.246 0.085 
1997 49 273992.96 123699.78 49 255339.73 120220.88 49 0.753 0.099 47 66414.15 42546.41 47 3313806.18 4237861.19 47 0.247 0.091 
1998 48 279176.87 124248.85 48 261529.14 118127.47 48 0.765 0.090 46 64148.75 42623.48 46 3771510.86 4739668.24 46 0.233 0.081 
1999 52 274033.77 116433.09 52 253774.86 107210.53 52 0.760 0.102 50 63797.39 38075.43 50 3210729.85 3239263.76 50 0.240 0.092 
2000 42 251756.12 102335.12 42 233123.35 92110.32 42 0.789 0.086 40 46870.18 21091.43 40 2815013.48 2825058.13 40 0.208 0.075 
2001 41 244960.06 98983.09  41 225744.35 85260.38 41 0.828 0.090 39 36569.27 19329.71 39 1822365.37 1883094.22 39 0.172 0.083 
2002 34 241576.69 103036.93 34 225902.39 91855.19 34 0.810 0.089 32 40494.91 19379.63 32 2089801.49 1478034.08 32 0.188 0.080 
2003 33 261039.86 162679.94 33 241767.11 159280.52 33 0.791 0.115 31 47589.03 32841.38 31 2120169.47 1820009.56 31 0.207 0.102 
2004 28 264242.60 159316.55 28 245730.82 153393.66 28 0.771 0.101 26 55913.14 42054.17 26 2660461.54 2640251.05 26 0.227 0.089 





























2006 25 262554.37 151372.94 25 243909.69 140061.37 25 0.776 0.101 23 52561.25 34258.02 23 2930521.63 3296418.43 23 0.222 0.082 
1995 27 137050.79 81077.73  27 131736.93 77630.07 27 0.793 0.137 25 27518.89 25609.48 25 2837311.25 3734492.90 25 0.198 0.110 
1996 32 125834.14 70994.28  32 122574.71 71751.78 32 0.800 0.130 30 24678.87 22063.71 30 2748478.84 4123596.11 30 0.193 0.109 
1997 27 157486.33 112253.24 27 155005.09 112373.79 27 0.804 0.134 25 25687.72 17474.33 25 3780242.70 5024262.03 25 0.188 0.111 
1998 27 175971.06 108371.88 27 171222.35 104395.73 27 0.804 0.119 25 28747.07 15826.69 25 3900144.49 4740320.96 25 0.191 0.099 
1999 40 135041.67 95481.60  40 127359.11 91574.56 40 0.823 0.097 38 20127.21 14699.69 38 2613762.00 4875401.33 38 0.174 0.085 
2000 46 143254.13 109120.80 46 134039.37 104077.61 46 0.809 0.109 44 22639.76 17189.35 44 3048404.80 6402232.59 44 0.183 0.079 
2001 43 156818.27 112995.34 43 141924.92 103674.28 43 0.810 0.121 41 24764.81 20117.29 41 7958490.43 23292462.10 41 0.180 0.076 
2002 39 120835.79 85302.58  39 113354.50 78258.16 39 0.813 0.089 37 20792.55 14417.71 37 2635375.63 5314750.34 37 0.187 0.083 
2003 32 185344.88 113356.04 32 172921.88 108741.88 32 0.823 0.092 30 28691.09 20712.85 30 4294877.94 6179956.47 30 0.172 0.076 
2004 33 184921.04 127967.38 33 169483.13 116443.65 33 0.839 0.083 31 24552.29 17225.56 31 3314602.39 4756077.99 31 0.157 0.068 




















2006 37 221277.66 195301.91 37 197897.10 180639.40 37 0.827 0.092 35 28875.81 21964.10 35 3297811.57 4226426.49 35 0.171 0.080 
 
 
  25 Table 4: differences in beta over time 
 
  years  1996 1997 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 2004  2005  2006 
1995 -1.039**  -0.538  -0.521  -2.293***  -2.149*** -2.587***  -1.851***  -  -  -0.723  2.611*** 
1996  -  0.501*  0.518* -1.254*** -1.11*** -1.548*** -0.812*  -  -  0.316  3.65*** 
1997 -  -  0.017  -1.755***  -1.612***  -2.049***  -1.313*** -  -  -0.185  3.149*** 
1998  - - -  -1.772***  -1.628***  -2.066***  -1.33***  - -  -0.202  3.132*** 
1999  - - -  - 0.144  -0.294  0.442  - -  1.57**  4.904*** 
2000  - - -  -  -  -0.437  0.298  - -  1.426**  4.76*** 
2001  - - -  -  -  -  0.736*  - -  1.864***  5.198*** 
2002  - - -  -  -  -  -  - -  1.128*  4.462*** 
2003  - - -  -  -  -  -  - -  -  - 















2005  - - -  -  -  -  -  - -  -  3.334*** 
1995 0.361*** 1.409*** 2.009***  1.291***  -1.271  1.284***  0.228  -1.13  -0.065  -0.144  -3.32 
1996  -  1.049***  1.648***  0.931***  -1.632  0.924*** -0.132 -1.491 -0.426  -0.504  -3.68 
1997 -  -  0.6***  -0.118  -2.68  -0.125  -1.181*** -2.539  -1.474  -1.553  -4.729 
1998  - - -  -0.718***  -3.28  -0.725***  -1.78*** -3.139  -2.074  -2.152  -5.329 
1999  - - -  -  -2.562  -0.007  -1.063*** -2.421  -1.357  -1.435  -4.611 
2000  - - -  -  - 2.555  1.499  0.141  1.206  1.127  -2.049 
2001  - - -  -  -  -  -1.056***  -2.414  -1.349  -1.428  -4.604 
2002  - - -  -  -  -  -  -1.358  -0.294  -0.372  -3.548 
2003  - - -  -  -  -  -  -  1.065  0.987  -2.19 





























2005  - - -  -  -  -  -  - -  -  -3.176 
1995  1.081  -0.859  -1.499  1.364 1.218 3.591  2.131  0.575  -0.53  0.677  -0.612 
1996 -  -1.94 -2.58  0.283  0.137 2.51***  1.05***  -0.506  -1.611 -0.404 -1.694 
1997  -  -  -0.64  2.223 2.077 4.050  2.989  1.434  0.329  1.536  0.246 
1998  - - -  2.863  2.717  5.090  3.629  2.074  0.969  2.176  0.886 
1999  - - -  -  -0.146  2.227***  0.767*  -0.789  -1.894  -0.687*  -1.977 
2000  - - -  -  -  2.373***  0.912**  -0.643  -1.748  -0.541  -1.831 
2001  - - -  -  -  -  -1.461***  -3.016  -4.121  -2.914***  -4.204 
2002  - - -  -  -  -  -  -1.555  -2.661  -1.453***  -2.743 
2003  - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -1.105  0.102  -1.188 




















2005  - - -  -  -  -  -  - -  -  -1.29 
  Note: *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level 
  26 Table 5: spread between areas over time  
 
  years  1996 1997 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 2004  2005  2006 
1995  -0.011 -0.016 -0.041  -0.01  -0.003  0.024  -0.015  -  -  0.044  0.026 
1996  - -0.005  -0.03  0.001 0.008 0.035  -0.004 -  -  0.055  0.037 
1997 -  -  -0.025 0.005  0.013  0.04  0  -  -  0.06  0.042 
1998  - - -  0.031  0.038  0.065  0.026  - -  0.085  0.068 
1999  - - -  - 0.007  0.034  -0.005  - -  0.054  0.037 
2000  - - -  -  - 0.027  -0.012  - -  0.047  0.029 
2001  - - -  -  -  -  -0.04  - -  0.02  0.002 
2002  - - -  -  -  -  -  - -  0.06  0.042 
2003  - - -  -  -  -  -  - -  -  - 















2005  - - -  -  -  -  -  - -  -  -0.018 
1995  0.007 0  0.02 0.014 0.015 0.022  0.029  0.011*  0.016 0.01 0.011 
1996 -  -0.006  0.013  0.008*** 0.009  0.015  0.022 0.005 0.009  0.003  0.005 
1997 -  -  0.02 0.014** 0.015  0.022  0.029 0.011 0.016  0.01  0.011 
1998  - - -  -0.006**  -0.004  0.002  0.009  -0.008  -0.004  -0.01  -0.008 
1999  - - -  -  0.001***  0.008  0.015  -0.003**  0.001**  -0.005  -0.003** 
2000  - - -  -  -  0.007*  0.014  -0.004  0  -0.006  -0.004 
2001  - - -  -  -  -  0.007  -0.011*  -0.006  -0.012  -0.011 
2002  - - -  -  -  -  -  -0.018  -0.013  -0.019  -0.018 
2003  - - -  -  -  -  -  -  0.004  -0.002  0 





























2005  - - -  -  -  -  -  - -  -  0.002 
1995 -0.014  0.01  0.014  0.041**  0.041  0.036  0.043*  0.052  0.052  0.032  0.031 
1996 -  0.024  0.028  0.055***  0.056***  0.05**  0.058***  0.066***  0.066***  0.047 0.045** 
1997 -  -  0.004  0.031** 0.031*  0.026 0.033**  0.042*  0.042* 0.022  0.021 
1998  - - -  0.027***  0.027**  0.021  0.029***  0.038**  0.038**  0.018  0.017** 
1999  - - -  -  0  -0.005**  0.002  0.011  0.011  -0.009**  -0.01* 
2000  - - -  -  -  -0.006  0.002  0.011  0.01  -0.009  -0.01 
2001  - - -  -  -  -  0.008*  0.016  0.016  -0.003  -0.005 
2002  - - -  -  -  -  -  0.009  0.008  -0.011*  -0.012* 
2003  - - -  -  -  -  -  - 0  -0.02  -0.021 




















2005  - - -  -  -  -  -  - -  -  -0.001 
  Note: *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level 
  27   28 
Table 6: changes in PCM over time 
 
  years  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
1995 -0.018  -0.003  0.006  -0.008  -0.016  -0.007  0.05  -  -  0.13***  0.137*** 
1996 -  0.015 0.024  0.01  0.002  0.011  0.068  -  -  0.148***  0.155*** 
1997 -  -  0.009 -0.005  -0.014  -0.004  0.053  -  -  0.132***  0.139*** 
1998 -  -  -  -0.014  -0.022  -0.013  0.044  -  -  0.124** 0.13** 
1999  -  - - -  -0.008  0.001  0.058  -  -  0.138***  0.144*** 
2000  -  - - - -  0.01  0.066  -  -  0.146***  0.153*** 
2001  -  - - - -  -  0.057  -  -  0.136***  0.143*** 
2002  -  - - - -  -  -  -  -  0.08*  0.086* 
2003  -  - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  - 















2005  -  - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  0.007 
1995 -0.004  -0.018  -0.008  0.006  0.047*** 0.093***  0.079***  0.08***  0.042**  0.053***  0.044** 
1996 -  -0.015  -0.005 0.009  0.051***  0.096***  0.082***  0.084***  0.045**  0.057***  0.047*** 
1997 -  -  0.01  0.024  0.066***  0.111***  0.097***  0.098***  0.06***  0.072***  0.062*** 
1998 -  -  -  0.014  0.056***  0.101***  0.087***  0.088***  0.05**  0.062***  0.052*** 
1999  -  - - -  0.042***  0.087***  0.073***  0.074***  0.036*  0.048**  0.038** 
2000  -  - - - -  0.046***  0.031*  0.033*  -0.005  0.006  -0.003 
2001  -  - - - -  -  -0.014  -0.013  -0.051**  -0.039**  -0.049*** 
2002  -  - - - -  -  -  0.001  -0.037*  -0.025  -0.035* 
2003  -  - - - -  -  -  -  -0.038*  -0.027  -0.036** 





























2005  -  - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.009 
1995 -0.024  0.055*  0.057*  0.042  0.031  -0.017  0.041  0.053*  0.087***  0.064**  0.087*** 
1996  -  0.079** 0.081** 0.066**  0.056*  0.007  0.065**  0.077**  0.112*** 0.088*** 0.112*** 
1997  -  -  0.002  -0.013  -0.024  -0.072***  -0.014 -0.002 0.032* 0.009  0.032 
1998 -  -  -  -0.015  -0.026  -0.074***  -0.016  -0.004  0.03  0.007  0.03 
1999  -  - - -  -0.011  -0.059***  -0.001  0.011  0.045***  0.021  0.045*** 
2000  -  - - - -  -0.049***  0.009  0.021  0.056***  0.032*  0.056*** 
2001  -  - - - -  -  0.058***  0.07***  0.105***  0.081***  0.105*** 
2002  -  - - - -  -  -  0.012  0.047***  0.023  0.047*** 
2003  -  - - - -  -  -  -  0.035**  0.011  0.035** 




















2005  -  - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  0.024 
  Note: *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level 